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Summary  findings
Every  approach to privatization  entails  tradeoffs.  The  shares  as an incentive  to purchase  them as well as
chief  advantage  of case-by-case  privatization-including  downwardly  flexible  share  prices.
sales  for cash  or initial  public  offerings  (IPOs)-is  Because  the quality  of the enterprises  chosen  for
efficiency. Case-by-case  privatization  generates  revenues,  privatization  is essential  to the success  of the IPO-Plus
gives  shareholders  control over managers,  and provides  program,  it is important  that few  enterprises  be offered
access  to capital  and skills.  But it is slow  and does not  in each auction  and that the list of enterprises  targeted
promote  widespread  public  participation.  for IPO-Plus  be published  before the program  is
Voucher-based  mass  privatization  programs,  by  launched.  This  will motivate  potential investors  to join
contrast,  are designed  to promote  equity  in the  the program by setting up management  companies,
distribution  of wealth,  through widespread  participation.  establishing  public  investment  funds,  and buying  shares
But they do not ensure  efficiency  because  they may not  in them.
generate  revenues,  bring in new capital or skills,  or give  IPO-Plus  is more  likely  than mass  privatization  to
shareholders  control over managers.  create "real owners." Investors  in IPO-Plus  are given a
To promote equity  and efficiency,  Goldberg,  subsidy,  but only  in proportion to what they themselves
Jedrzejczak,  and Fuchs  propose a new form of  choose  to pay.  The individual  determines  (up to a
privatization-IPO-Plus-that  incorporates  key  features  ceiling)  how much to invest  in the program.
of both case-by-case  privatization  and mass  privatization.  IPO-Plus  is particularly  appropriate  where the
IPO-Plus  promotes  equity  through widespread  (but not  objective  is to encourage  outside  ownership  rather than
mass)  participation  in privatization.  It promotes  significant  employee  ownership.  It encourages  the
efficiency  by making  privatization  transparent,  by  emergence  of market  intermediaries  and ensures  the
fostering  capital market  development,  and by creating  concentration  of enterprise  shares  in investment  funds.
independent  financial  institutions  that would  press  Outside  ownership  and concentration  of share voting
companies  to improve  their financial  performance.  rights  provide  the basis  for enterprise restructuring  and
It relies  not on vouchers  but on the sale  of low-priced  economic  growth.
public  shares.  It allows  deferred  payment  for company
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INTRODUCTION
The  need for innovative  privatization  methods
This paper addresses policy-makers interested in privatization. As
acknowledged in the World Development Report, "From Plan to Market"2,  each
approach to privatization creates trade-offs among various goals.
On the one hand, case-by-case privatization, such as sales for cash or
initial public offerings (IPO's) provides efficiency.  Important advantages of case-
by-case privatization are generating revenues, creating control of shareholders
over managers and access to capital and skills.  But this approach does not
promote widespread public participation in the privatization process and is
relatively slow.
On the other hand, voucher-based mass privatization programs (MPP's)
are designed to promote equity in the distribution of wealth and widespread
public participation in privatization, but MPP's do not sufficiently ensure
efficiency, because they do not bring in new capital or skills, create control of
shareholders over managers or generate revenues.
This paper proposes a new form of privatization, which includes central
features of both case-by-case privatization and mass privatization in order to
promote both efficiency and equity.
Selection of suitable methods for privatization is still a timely issue in
many countries.  Several transition economies - with Russia as the prime
example - have completed MPP's, but are left with undivested state holdings in
partially privatized companies and with large non-privatized sectors such as the
infrastructure sector (transport, energy and telecommunications) and the
financial sector (banks and insurance).  In other large countries, such as China
' Comments  from  Loup  Brefort,  Mark  St.  Giles,  Matthew  Hogopian,  Mukul  Kumar,  Ira  Lieberman
and  John  Nellis  are  appreciated.
2 See  page  3.12  of the  World  Development  Report,.1996,  published  by  the  World  Bank.2
and Vietnam,  there continues  to be considerable  state ownership,  and wide
distribution  of property  rights  to the public at minimum  cost - as envisaged  in
mass  privatization  programs  - may be impractical  or politically  unacceptable.
The potential  role of cash sales or IPO's  is also limited,  because  private  sector
purchasing  power  is small and the financial  infrastructure  for conducting  public
share  offerings  is insufficiently  developed. In African countries  the number  of
companies  targeted  for privatization  may  be small  and the values  to be
distributed  may be insufficient  to support  a mass  privatization  program.
In choosing  mass  privatization  rather  than the case-by-case  approach
countries  of Eastern  Europe  and the Former  Soviet  Union  were predominantly
concerned  with equity considerations:  private  wealth available  for buying  assets
was low in comparison  to the supply  of assets  to be privatized. "Of  course, low
wealth does not by itself pose  a problem  for privatization  (as  opposed  to public
revenue),  since it only implies  low prices  of privatized  assets... More important
than low wealth is the extremely  uneven  distribution  of private wealth,  with black
market  businessmen  and ex-communist  officials  holding  the lion's  share". 3
Case-by-case  privatization  in Eastern  Europe  and the former Soviet  Union  would
have  been politically  unacceptable,  as state assets  would have  been sold to
communists,  criminals  and foreigners  for very low prices.
However,  experience  has shown  that, although  MPP's  are designed  to
create  broad  distribution  of ownership,  they do not necessarily  achieve  this goal.
Rather  than resulting  in broad  ownership,  quick  transfer  of ownership  in Russia
led  to the transfer  of wealth  to a narrow  group  of enterprise  owners. While  the
MPP  created  a critical  mass  of private  enterprises,  it failed  to establish  the
expected  political  support  for the reform  process. "Overall,  the way privatization
has been conducted  is resented  by many Russian  citizens  who feel that they
have  received  a pittance  while some managers  - and their high-placed  political
supporters  - gained  a fortune" 4. A recent  empirical  study 5 found that the
shareholding  of enterprise  managers  in Russia  is high - at around  60% of equity
capital  - and is still growing. This experience  has given  rise to growing
skepticism  about mass  privatization  which stresses  speed  and pertains  to
achieve  widespread  participation  in a "big bang"  through  the free distribution  of
property.
There is also growing  recognition  of the weakness  of MPP's  in promoting
efficiency. As property  is distributed  for "free",  shareholders  tend to be more
apathetic  and take the attitude  that they do not bear  any real risk should  their
shares  lose in value. Rather  than resulting  in shareholder  control  over
managers,  MPP's  gave rise to growing  insider  domination. Although  insider
3Boycko  et  al,  1994,  p.  254.
4 World  Development  Report,  1996,  Chapter  3.
5 Blasi  and  Schleifer,  May  1996.3
entrenchment  in the Russia  MPP  can partly  be attributed  to the political  power  of
enterprise  managers  and the weakness  of the Central  Government,  it is also a
reflection  of the design  of the MPP. Insider  entrenchment  in Russia  stems,  inter
a/ia,  from  the free distribution  of privatization  certificates. Free distribution
encouraged  citizens  to re-sell  their certificates  for a pittance  to insiders  and
contributed  to the weakness  of the investment  funds,  which lacked  liquidity  and
could not establish  control  over enterprise  directors  (see box I on the Russian
MPP).
The IPO-Plus  method  of privatization  proposed  in this paper is designed
to achieve:  (i) equity through  widespread  public,  but not mass  participation  in the
privatization  process,  and (ii) efficiency  through  transparent  privatization  and
capital  market  development  creating  independent  financial institutions  with
responsibility  for putting  pressure  on companies  to improve  their  financial
performance. Instead  of vouchers  as under  an MPP,  the IPO-Plus relies  on (i)
the sale of low-priced  public  participation  shares, (ii) incentives  for the purchase
of company  shares  by allowing  deferred  payment,  and (iii) downward  flexibility  in
share prices. Each of these features  is discussed  in more  detail  below.
THE IPO-PLUS  SCHEME
A brief overview  of the scheme
Under  the IPO-Plus scheme  private  interests  are allowed  to establish
special investment  funds called Privatization  Investment  Funds  (PIF's)  to buy the
shares  of enterprises  being privatized. The PIF's issue  their own Public
Participation  Shares  (PPS's)  to the public. These  participation  shares  are issued
at a uniform  low price  to ensure  broad public  participation.  A deferred  payment
mechanism  generates  purchasing  power  to supplement  the capital  raised  by the
PIF's  through  the issue  of shares  (PPS's). In addition  the purchasing  power  of
the PIF's is enhanced  by allowing  them to buy the shares  of enterprises  being
privatized  at a low price. The structure  of the scheme  is summarized  in the
chart.
To initiate  the program,  management  companies  are formed  by private
interests. Management  companies  are required  to provide  some founders
capital  from private  sources  to enable  them to establish  PIF's  as joint stock
companies. Once  they have  been licensed,  management  companies  can apply
to license  one or more PIF's under  their management.  To encourage  the
founding of PIF's  the regulatory  authority  for the securities  industry  will need  to
develop  transparent,  rigorous,  but  open licensing  procedures. Once PIF's  are
licensed  and prospectuses  for public  offering  have been registered,
management  companies  can engage  in selling PPS's  to the public.4
Box I  Russian  privatization  - lessons  for IPO-Plus
The  first  phase  of privatization  in  Russia  took  place  from  1992  through  1994  and  included
the  MPP  for medium  and  large  companies.  The  design  of the  Russian  MPP  did not  contain  an
institutional  concentration  of ownership  through  financial  intermediaries  such  as investment  funds.
The  designers  believed  that  funds  would  emerge  spontaneously  by  buying  vouchers  from
employees  and  using  them  to participate  in  auctions  to gain  a sufficient  stake,  if not  a controlling
block,  in enterprises.  "The  voucher  investment  funds,  initially  constrained  from  acquiring  more
than  10  percent  of the  shares  in  any  enterprise,  were  left  with  some  30%  of the  public's  vouchers
and  widely  dispersed  ownership,  but  without  a clear  role  in  enterprise  governance  or in  capital
market  development.  These  funds  remain  a problem  for  the Government,  notably  the  Russian
SEC.....6
The  Russian  Voucher  Investment  Funds  (VIF's)  suffered  from  four  major  problems:  (i)
they  lacked  liquidity,  (ii)  they  did  not  have  access  to company  registries  and  were  unable  to
establish  ownership  after  having  bought  shares,  (iii)  there  was  insufficient  time  to revise  the  legal
foundation  to support  them  in  their  struggle  with  the  incumbent  directors,  and  (iv)  the  tax code
discouraged  them  from  restructuring  their  portfolios  of enterprise  shares,  as heavy  taxation  was
imposed  on  capital  gains.  As a result,  of some  650  VIF's  originally  formed  in 1992-1993,  only
some  300  are  still  in  existence,  and  of these  perhaps  only  80  to 100  are  viable.  These  viable
funds  account  for about  75%  of invested  vouchers,  but  the  quality  of  their  performance  is
uncertain 7
The  second  phase  of Russian  privatization  began  in 1995  and  was  based  on  cash  sales
of the  residual  shares  in  the  enterprises,  which  had  been  privatized  through  the  MPP  in phase
one. The  second  phase  also  included  the  loans-for-shares  scheme.  "Residual  share  sales  were
largely  non-transparent,....The  process  led  to increased  control  by  enterprise  managers  and  the
ownership  of major  banks..  One  analyst  indicates  that  the  outcome  of the  MPP  doomed  cash
privatization.  That  is  outsiders  are  loath  to purchase  block  of shares  for cash  in  enterprises
8 owned  by  insiders".  The  proposed  privatization  strategy  for Russia  in  the  third  phase  (1996-
1997)  is mainly  based  on  a case-by-case  approach.
The  move  of Russian  privatization  from  mass  to case-by-case  privatization  provides  an
important  lesson  for IPO-Plus  privatization.  The  design  of IPO-Plus  is based  on  a combination  of
features  from  both  approaches.  By  making  PIF's  an  in-built  feature  of the  design  the  IPO-Plus
attempts  to avoid  the  problems  encountered  by  the  Russian  VIF's. Incorporating  PIF's  as a
design  feature  reduces  the  power  of directors  and  thwarts  them  in  their  attempts  to prevent
outside  owners  from  acquiring  controlling  blocks  of shares.  The  cash  payment  for the  shares  in
the  PIF's  (the  PPS's)  provides  the  PIF  managers  with  some  initial  liquidity  and  enables  them  to
establish  a power  base  vis-a-vis  the  enterprise  directors.  In  addition,  an  important  pre-condition
for launching  IPO-Plus  is  establishing  a sound  legal  foundation  for  the PIF's.
6 Lieberman  et al,  1996.
7 St.  Giles,  March,  1997.
8 Lieberman  et al,  1996.5
How the IPO-Plus  scheme works
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*  Enterprise  shares  are offered  in the first auction  at "nominal  book  value". If there is over-subscription,
shares  are  allocated  pro-rata  among  the bidding  PIF's  at "nominal  book  value'. If there is under-
subscription,  a second  auction  is organized  where  the shares  are sold, irrespective  of the book  value,  to the
highest  bidder.6
The PPS's  are regular  shares  in mutual  funds incorporated  as joint stock
companies  and constitute  the only class of shares  in a PIF. The price  of the
PPS's in each subscription  is pre-set  by the Government  as a design  parameter
of the program. A low subscription  price  will encourage  widespread  public
participation,  as will limiting  the number  of PPS's,  which  can be purchased  by
any one person  in the primary  issue. Such a limitation  is similar  to the provision
in MPP  schemes,  whereby  each  citizen is entitled  to only a certain  number  of
vouchers. However,  in the IPO-Plus  there is likely  to be more  variation  in the
number  of PPS's  purchased. Setting  a higher  limit  for each person's  purchase  of
PPS's  provides  greater  choice  for those individuals,  who can afford  to buy
PPS's, but distributes  the benefits  of participating  in the privatization  program
less equitably. This important  trade-off  between  equity  and feasibility  -ensuring
that the volume  of PPS's  sold is sufficient  to support  the program  - must  be
addressed  by policy-makers  in the design  of the program.
PIF's  sell PPS's  at a given  price  during  the subscription  period. A lengthy
subscription  period  is desirable,  because  it allows  the PIF's  to market  their PPS's
to the public,  but it also raises  issues regarding  equity among  PPS  owners 9.
Once  the subscription  period  is over, PPS's  will trade on the
secondary  market  at prices  reflecting  the market  value of the enterprise  assets
held by the PIF's. By purchasing  PPS's  on the secondary  market  investors  will
be in a position  to accumulate  larger  blocks  of PPS's,  thereby  enhancing
corporate  governance  in the PIF's.
THE PROCESS  OF ENTERPRISE  PRIVATIZATION
The  role of investment  funds  and the bidding  process
The public can participate  in IPO-Plus privatization  only through
privatization  investment  funds. There is no direct sale of enterprise  shares  to
individuals  at preferential  terms as in other mass  privatization  schemes. This in
no way precludes  citizens  from buying  shares  in privatized  companies  directly,
but such purchases  will be at market  prices  and without  the deferred  payment
mechanism  made  available  to the PIF's (described  in the next section).
Enterprise  shares  are offered  to the PIF's at a low starting  price.
Determining  this offer price  may be difficult,  but a typical,  less arbitrary  choice
would be the "nominal  book value". This is usually  a politically  "safe"  choice,
because  book  value is believed  by politicians  to reflect  the original  investment  by
the state in the enterprise  and therefore  pre-empts  accusations  of selling state
property  "too cheaply".
9  In Former Soviet Union countries the maximum subscription period allowed under joint stock
company laws is usually 6 months.7
In the event  of over-subscription  for shares  of an enterprise  being  offered
at auction,  shares  are allocated  on a pro-rata  basis. This prevents  share prices
from being bid up. Pro-rata  allocation  of the shares  of the more attractive
companies  among  widely  held funds is an equitable  solution. Although  a
traditional  auction  would allow upward  price  flexibility  to determine  the allocation
of shares,  under IPO-Plus  bidding up the prices  of enterprise  shares  would be
self-defeating,  because  PIF's  would compete  by using  the enhanced  purchasing
power  provided  by the deferred  payment  mechanism.  In effect they would
undermine  the role of this mechanism. It is worth underlining  that the main
objectives  of IPO-Plus  are widespread  and transparent  privatization,  and it will
not be possible  to achieve  these objectives  without  compromising  on the
objective  of maximizing  privatization  proceeds.
In the event of under-subscription  for enterprise  shares, prices  of
enterprise  shares  at the auction  should  be allowed  to drop below the initial
offering  price  -- i.e., remaining  enterprise  shares  will be sold to the highest
bidder. Thus,  when  demand proves  to be insufficient  despite  the low initial  offer
price, downward  price  flexibility  for any unsold  shares  will encourage  PIF's  to
make  bids. PIF's  are, however,  in no way be obliged  to purchase  enterprise
shares,  even at prices below  the initial  offer price  and after  taking into account
the deferred  payment  mechanism.  Enterprises  may remain  financially
unattractive  at a low (or zero) equity  price. Any obligation  to buy such
enterprises  will force the PIF's  to purchase  assets  with negative  value and
undermine  the commercial  objectives  of the PIF's.
DEFERRED  PAYMENT  FOR ENTERPRISE  SHARES
Generating  sufficient  purchasing  power
The purchasing  power  of the PIF's  in buying  shares  offered  for
privatization  is enhanced  by the deferred  payment  mechanism  made  available  by
the Government. By using  deferred  payment  PIF's  can increase  their purchasing
power  in proportion  to the number  of PPS's,  which they sell to the public. The
aim should  be to generate  sufficient  purchasing  power  for the sale of the assets
being privatized.
Prior  to launching  the program  the size of the deferred  payment  is set in
relation  to the number  of participation  shares  which  the PIF's are estimated  to be
able to sell,  the "cash-credit  ratio",  CCR. The intention  is to give the PIF's
access  to sufficient  purchasing  power  to purchase  the shares  targeted  for
privatization  under  the program  0. The CCR  is a uniform  ratio  applied  to all
PIF's,  determined  by the Government.
10  Note  that  there is no obligation  on  the part of the PIF's  to bid for shares  at any auction. PIF's
use  their  own  assessment  of enterprise  future earning  capacity  in determining  whether  to bid  for8
CCR  =  Value of assets  for IPO-Plus privatization  - 1
Own Capital  (No.  of PPS's  sold X Price  of PPS)
Establishing  an ex ante value  for the CCR can be approached  from two
angles: (a) by estimating  the number  of PPS's,  which  the PIF's  can reasonably
be expected  to sell, and (b) by assessing  how many PPS's  the PIF's  will need  to
sell in order  to be viable. Although  it will be difficult  to make any precise
assessment  of the demand  for PPS's, an estimate  should  be possible  taking into
consideration  such factors  as eligible  population,  propensity  to save, and
willingness  to take risks. It should  also be possible  to make a pro forma
assessment  of the viability  of the PIF's. PIF's  will have  to sell a minimum
number  of PPS's  so as to generate  sufficient  fees to cover the costs  of managing
their assets. Approaching  the issue  from both  these angles  should provide
reasonably  reliable  guidance  in setting  the CCR.
There is a risk that, after launching  the program,  the sale of the PPS's
turns out to have been overestimated,  and the CCR  will ex post have been set
too low  to provide  sufficient  purchasing  power  for the program. If it takes longer
to develop  interest  in the program  than initially  envisaged,  sales of PPS's  may
initially  be disappointing  despite  the low price. In pre-empting  such a situation
the Government  and the PIF's  should be encouraged  to undertake  an intensive
initial publicity  program.
If PPS  sales  turn out to be lower  than estimated,  two possibilities  exist.
First, it is likely  that a larger  proportion  of enterprise  shares  will be sold at the
second round  auctions,  i.e.  at below  their nominal  value. Second,  the authorities
can consider  the option  of increasing  the CCR. There may be dangers in
changing  this parameter  too frequently  both as regards  the credibility  of the
program  as a whole and as regards  equity  among PPS  investors. But at certain
intervals,  maybe  annually,  and after  the closure  of subscription  in an open series
currently  being  offered by the PIF's, an effective  means  of attracting  more
momentum  to an IPO-Plus program  would be to increase  the size of the CCR.
Providing  incentives  by setting  the terms  of the  deferred  payment
The terms  of the deferred  payment  are important  in giving  the PIF's  the
opportunity  to participate  constructively  in the process  of enterprise  restructuring.
In the period  immediately  following  privatization  - i.e. before  there has been
opportunity  for enterprise  restructuring  - it is unlikely  that the PIF's  will be able  to
fund repayments  of principal  and interest  on the deferred  payment. The PIFs'
only source  of liquidity  will be through  the sale of enterprise  shares  at their
shares.  When  making  bids  they  are  given  access  to the  deferred  payment  scheme  according  to
the  size  of their  bids.9
market  prices." 1 Although  it is to be expected  that the market  value of enterprise
shares  will exceed  the purchasing  price paid by the PIF's  (book value  with
deferred  payment),  the PIF's  will need any liquidity  they can raise  through  the
sale of shares  for enterprise  restructuring.  Tight repayment  terms  on the
deferred  payment  for shares  may result in "forced  sales" of shares,  depressing
the value of shares  in privatized  companies  and eventually  threatening  the
solvency  of the PIF's.
To give the PIF's  a sufficient  time-frame  for conducting  enterprise
restructuring  it will be advisable  to structure  the deferred  payment  with a grace
period,  during  which no principal  is repaid  and no interest  accrues. Following  the
grace period  concessional  terms should be offered  on the repayment  of the
deferred  payment. Alternatively,  rescheduling  and/or partial  write-off  of the
deferred  payment  could be a component  of the program  design. However,  so as
to avoid  giving the PIF's perverse  incentives, i.e. giving PIF's the incentive  to
show poor performance  so that their debt will be rescheduled  or forgiven  2, any
rescheduling  or write-off  should  be independent  of performance,  and uniformly
applied.
Under  IPO-Plus privatization,  PPS  holders  are exposed  to the economic
benefits  and risks  associated  with enterprise  restructuring  irrespective  of the
terms  of the deferred  payment. 
3 PPS  investors  are able to choose  whether  they
wish  to participate  or not. They are able  to select freely among  the PIF's,  and it
is up to each PIF to convince  potential  PPS  purchasers  of the PIF's  future
performance  potential. The PIF's  will need  to demonstrate  their professionalism
by bidding  for the most promising  enterprises  and by actively  engaging  in
enterprise  restructuring. Over  time those management  companies  which are
successful  in enhancing  the value of the assets under  their management  will
have greater  ease in attracting  the public  to purchase  PPS's.
SELECTION  OF ENTERPRISES  FOR PRIVATIZATION
Selecting  suitable  enterprises  will  provide the momentum  behind  the program
Unlike  case-by-case  privatization,  mass  privatization  requires  the
selection  of a critical  core of enterprises,  which  form the "supply  side" of the
program. The distinguishing  feature  of an MPP  is the large number  of
1 Initially  PIF's  will have  access  to some  liquidity  arising  from the sale  of PPS's. This may be
useful  in funding  some  establishment  costs. However,  as PPS's  give  access  to deferred
payment,  when  they are used  for purchasing  enterprise  shares,  PIF's  will have a strong  incentive
to use  funds  from the sale  of PPS's  at the  enterprise  auctions.
12 Similar  perverse  incentives,  known  as moral hazard, arise in other insurance  schemes,  such  as
deposit  insurance.
13 PPS holders'  downside  risk is limited  to the  value  of the PPS. Their  upside  risk is enhanced  by
the low initial  offer price  and  the deferred  payment  mechanism.10
enterprises  to be privatized  and the speed of the process. As speed is a major
objective,  evaluation  of individual  enterprises  and selection  on the basis  of
quality is impractical. Moreover,  as vouchers  are free, it is considered  "fair"  and
politically  acceptable  to include  enterprises  of unknown,  possibly  negative,  value.
In Eastern  Europe  and the Former  Soviet  Union large numbers  of enterprises
were included  in MPP's  to ensure popular  support  and to justify the distribution  of
14 vouchers  to the whole population.
Under IPO-Plus the number  of enterprises  selected for privatization  will
be smaller.  Enterprises  will need to be made available  successively  in order to
balance  the supply of enterprises  with the demand ("purchasing  power"),  which
increases  only gradually  as the PIF's  sell their shares  to the population. Building
supply  and demand  will be a simultaneous  and continuous  process.  The process
can be described  in a number  of steps. First,  the process  of licensing
management  companies  and PIF's  can start  as soon as the relevant  legislation
and regulations  are in place. The licensing  process  can be set in motion
irrespective  of the start  date  for the auction  of enterprise  shares. Second,  the pre-
selected  list of enterprises  to be privatised  through  the scheme  should  be
announced  at an early  stage  so as to encourage  participation  and allow  the
enterprises  to prepare  prospectus  material  and the management  companies  to
assess  the enterprises. Management  companies  should  have  the opportunity  to
evaluate  the enterprises  and undertake  due diligence  studies  in as far as this is
possible. Third,  so as stimulate  the sale of shares  in the PIF's  (the PPS's),  these
shares  should  be made  available  at a fixed offer  price  throughout  the prospectus
period  (e.g.  for six months). Fourth,  so as to establish  momentum  for the sale of
PPS's  it is important  that the auction  process  commences  early  during  the
subscription  period,  preferably  by conducting  regular  auctions  of a number  of
enterprises.
The number  of enterprises  to be sold at any one auction  will need  to reflect
the PIF's  success  in selling  PPS's  in the preceding  period. Public  participation  in
the privatisation  process  through  the purchase  of PPS's  will depend  on building  up
a sense  of excitement  about  the whole process.  Were PIF's  required  to sell
sufficient  PPS's  to purchase  a larger  number  of enterprises  ptior to the initiation  of
the auction  process,  the  danger  is that the PIF's  marketing  campaign  to sell their
PPS's  would run out of momentum.  Thus PIF's  should  be encouraged  to buy at
auctions  while  simultaneously  marketing  subscription  in their shares. The auction
of good enterprises  will result  in positive  publicity,  as will the active  participation  of
the PIF's  in the auction  process.  As more  companies  are auctioned,  publicity  will
stimulate  the sale of more PPS's  and gradually  it will be possible  to auction  more
enterprises. 15 Should  the sale  of PPS's  be smaller  than  anticipated  or delayed,  the
sale of enterprise  shares  will have  to be reduced  reflecting  the limited  funds at the
14 Lieberman  et al, 1995;  Boycko  et al, 1994.
15 St. Giles,  1995.11
PIFs'  disposal.  Thus the scale and speed  of privatization  will depend  on building
demand  for PPS's
It is here  - with regard  to the scale  and speed  of privatization  - that IPO-
Plus  presents  a compromise  between  case-by-case  privatization  and mass
privatization.  As the sale of enterprises  is a continuous  process  under IPO-Plus,
the targeting  of companies  for privatization  needs  to be more selective  than in
MPP's. As in case-by-case  privatization  the selection  of good companies  for the
IPO-Plus  is important  so as to stimulate  demand  for PPS's, but  the demands  on
enterprise  quality  are less under IPO-Plus  due to the deferred  payment  and the
fact that the (low)  initial offer price  cannot  rise in  the bidding  for enterprise
shares.
As mentioned  above,  it is important  to hold regular  auctions  of enterprises
to preserve  the momentum  behind  the program. Auctions can be conducted  for
larger  or smaller  batches  of enterprises. If the number  of enterprises  offered  at
individual  auctions  is relatively  small, PIF managers  will have  a better  opportunity
to assess  the viability  of the individual  enterprises. However,  if the number  of
enterprises  committed  to the IPO-Plus  program  as a whole  is too small, it will be
difficult  to justify building  the required  financial  market  infrastructure,  hamper
possibilities  for the PIF's  to undertake  risk diversification  and reduce  public
interest  in buying  PPS's. Prior  to the launching  of the program  the Government
needs  to commit  to privatizing  a significant  pre-selected  number  of enterprises
which meet  the quality  criteria  of IPO-Plus. Exactly  which  enterprises  among
those selected  for privatization  are scheduled  for sale at the individual  auctions
can be decided  subsequently  to reflect  progress  with the sale of PPS's.
Although  it is desirable  that the subscription  period  for any series of PPS's
be as long as possible,  a long  subscription  period  with a fixed offer price  does
raise  certain  equity issues. Investors  who buy PPS's  in the latter part of the
subscription  period  possess  more information  about  the portfolios  of enterprise
shares  owned  by the PIF's  than those who buy earlier. They will most  probably
also pay less  in real terms for their shares. Inflation  during  the subscription
period  will contribute  to raising  the real value of enterprise  assets  and reducing
the real burden  of purchasing  PPS's. Nonetheless,  practical  considerations
argue  for keeping  the subscription  price  unchanged  during  the subscription
period. It will also be advisable  to disallow  dividends  and trade in enterprise
shares  during  the subscription  period  to prevent  dilution  of the PIF's. This will
allow the PIF's  to assemble  their portfolios  and give shareholders  the opportunity
to observe  the final portfolio  of the PIF's. At the close of the subscription  period
each shareholder  will own an interest  in the pool of all assets  of the PIF,
including  accumulated  interest  and any realized  gains, proportionate  to the
amount  of shares  bought.12
In preparing  the selection  of enterprises  and the proportion  of the shares
in these enterprises  to be privatized  under  an IPO-Plus program  it should be
underlined  that IPO-Plus is not envisaged  to be an exclusive  method  of
privatization. On the contrary,  shares  in the same  enterprises,  which  are sold on
concessional  IPO-Plus  terms, may  also be offered  to employees  on
concessional  terms  or offered  to the general  public (including  PIF's) at non-
concessional  prices. It is envisaged  that shares  sold to the PIF's  on preferential
terms and shares  offered  for free sale to the public  will together  constitute  at
least 51%  of the shares  in the individual  enterprises. Whichever  method  of
privatization  is chosen,  all shares  will be freely tradable  on the secondary  market
allowing  institutional  investors,  including  PIF's,  to accumulate  significant
holdings.
BIDDING  AND PRICING  ENTERPRISE  SHARES
Promoting  sales of enterprise  shares  in an uncertain  economic  environment
According  to the auction  pricing  mechanism  described  above,  enterprise
shares  are initially  offered  to the PIF's  at a fixed-price. Over-subscription  results
in pro-rata  allocation  of shares. By allocating  shares  pro rata,  some measure  of
the interest  of each PIF in the shares  of any given enterprise  is reflected  in the
final distribution  of shares. A PIF  which has been successful  in selling PPS's  will
also be "rewarded"  by being  able to bid for a larger  quantity  of shares  at the
auction  of attractive  enterprises.
Nonetheless,  the fundamental  question  remains  as to why the valuation  of
individual  enterprises,  as reflected  in the bids made  by the PIF's, should  not be
allowed  to influence  share prices  in an upward  direction  at the time of the initial
public offering. First, keeping  the offer  price unchanged  rather than allowing
prices  to be bid up at the auction preserves  the value  of the "give-away"  element
in the privatization  process. Second,  the availability  of information  on the current
status and future prospects  of enterprises  in transition  economies  is very poor. If
PIF's  are encouraged  to bid up the share  prices,  the risk is that shares  will be
priced  above  their intrinsic  value,  thereby  exposing  the PIF's  to potential  financial
losses. Empirically,  the difficulty  of evaluating  enterprises  is borne  out by
experiences  in Russia,  where investors  were allowed  to make "sophisticated
bids"  with a maximum  price, but only 2% chose  to do so: "Usually,  large
investors  just brought  in suitcases  of vouchers,  and tendered  them to get
whatever  shares  they could  get in the auction.  Evidently,  even large investors
had no idea what the companies  were  worth, and felt that shares  were cheap
enough not  to bother  with complicated  bids." 16
16 Boycko et al, 1994.13
In cases,  where  the initial  offer price  is "too high"  and enterprises  remain
unsold,  it will be necessary  to stimulate  the sale of unsold  shares  by allowing
17 downward  price  flexibility  in a second  auction.  Establishing  a sufficient  number
of PIF's  will be important  so as to prevent  collusion  in the bidding  process.
Preventing  collusion  among  bidding parties  is essential  - both  with the fixed offer
price  and in the flexible-price  second round. Collusion  by "bidding  rings"  can
best be avoided  by promoting  the emergence  of a sufficiently  large number  of
PIF's, at least  20, who compete  vigorously  to buy shares  of the best companies,
and who are unlikely  to be able  to maintain  a cartel,  even if one is formed. Low
costs of entry in establishing  PIF's  and in participating  at the auctions  will
promote  efficient  price  formation  at the auctions.
Setting  the initial  offering  price may be difficult,  both  economically  and
politically. Information  on enterprise  fundamentals  is unreliable  due to poor
accounting  systems. The intrinsic  value  of enterprise  assets is difficult  to
determine  due to uncertainty  regarding  corporate  governance  after privatization
(sale  of controlling  or non-controlling  stakes), uncertain  demand  for the products
produced  by the enterprise,  and uncertainty  with regard  to broader  factors  such
as country  risk and macroeconomic  stability. As mentioned  above,  many
countries  have  opted  for using  "nominal  book"  value  as a starting price  because
of political  convenience.
The bias in favor of under-pricing  in IPO-Plus privatization  has some
similarity  with price-setting  behavior  in traditional  IPO's. On the IPO market,
once  the issuer and underwriter  have  agreed  on an offer price,  any excess
demand leads  to quantity  rationing  rather  than adjustment  of the offer price.
Underwriters  are remunerated  for accepting  uncertainty  about the value  of the
shares  offered  by systematic  under-pricing  of primary  offers. Neither in the
traditional  IPO,  nor in the IPO-Plus does  this detract  from the incentive  for
underwriters  or PIF managers  to arrive  at a realistic  valuation  of enterprises.
The risk is that underwriters  in the traditional  IPO  will underwrite  shares  at a
higher  price  than they can fetch on the secondary  market  or "cheat"  an issuer  by
setting  the price  too low. 18 Similarly,  PIF managers  in IPO-Plus privatization
risk entering bids  which are too large at the given  offer price or entering  a bid
which is too small  and does not reflect  the potential  earning  capacity  of the
enterprise  being  offered. This also applies  in cases of over-subscription  of the
shares  on offer, as the size of the bids determines  the pro-rata  allocation  of
shares.
17 It may  not  be  possible  to sell  certain  enterprises  at a positive  value  prior  to enterprise
restructuring  or relief  from debt/arrears.
18  On the IPO  market  such  price-setting  would  rapidly  undermine  the business  interests  of the
underwriter.14
Underwriters  in traditional  IPO's  and PIF managers  in IPO-Plus
privatization  both run the risk  of the "winners  curse"  - they may be allocated
shares  in the primary  offer  which  fall in value in secondary  trading. They also
risk losing credibility  as underwriters  (in the traditional  IPO)  or with investors  in
PPS's  (in IPO-Plus), if they do not bid aggressively  enough  for attractive
enterprises. However,  by initially  allocating  shares  at a fixed offer  price  the IPO-
Plus recognizes  the difficulty  of making  reliable  assessments  of future earnings
in transition  economies  and puts much  less emphasis  on valuing  enterprise
earning  prospects  than the traditional  IPO.
In allocating  shares  at the time of privatization  MPP's  have generally
relied on auctions  in one form or another 19. The purest  method  of auction
allocates  shares  according  to Walsarian  general  equilibrium  pricing. This
method  was closely  approximated  in the "Czech  model",  which  was based  on the
simultaneous  centralized  auction  (exchange  of vouchers  for enterprise  shares)  of
all enterprises  to be privatized. Shares  were offered  simultaneously  for fixed
prices,  which  were loosely  related  to their relative  book  values. In case of under-
subscription,  demand  and supply  were matched  by reducing  share values in
terms of vouchers. In case of small over-subscription  demand  was satisfied  on a
pro-rata  basis  and in case of large over-subscription  shares  were  withdrawn  and
included  in the subsequent  round  at a higher  price. The iterative  nature  of this
process  led  to improved  price  formation. Allocation  of shares  was achieved  by
determining  relative  values  with voucher  points,  rather  than absolute  money
values,  being the numeraire  0
In the "Russian  model"  bidders  at the auctions  could make  two types of
offers. They could  tender vouchers  for whatever  number  of shares  were
available  for allocation  (type  A offers) or specify  the quantity  of shares  desired at
a certain  "cut-off' price  (type B offers). The number  of shares  allocated  to each
bidder  was calculated  by adding  up all the bids of both types  and arriving  at an
equilibrium  price. The Russian  model  was simple  to implement  and succeeded
in giving unsophisticated  investors  access  to share ownership,  preventing  them
from being  out-bid by professional  investors. But,  when it came  to actually
implementing  the program,  almost  no offers  were of type B and the iterative
process  remained  virtually  unused. As a result  auction prices  did not reflect
economic  values  and shares  were generally  regarded  as so cheap  that more
complicated  bidding  techniques  could  be dispensed  with. The decentralized
auction  process  adopted  by the Russians  reflected  the political  power  of
19  There are obvious  advantages associated with the auction model in its "pure" form. Auctions
allocate shares according to the principle of willingness to pay rather than rationing, they define
market-based enterprise valuations and facilitate subsequent secondary market trading, they
reduce reliance on bureaucratic intervention to a minimum, and they allow investors full freedom
of choice.  But, as described in the text, auctions in MPP's do not always live up to all these
characteristics.
20S Shafik  (1  993 and 1994).15
directors  and local governments  and resulted  in privatization  characterized  by
fragmentation  and lack  of iteration. This fragmentation  proved  to be the single
most important  source  of insider  power,  giving insiders  the opportunity  to
manipulate  auctions  and buy majority  stakes.
The sales mechanism  adopted  in IPO-Plus privatization  builds on
experience  with traditional  IPO's and with MPP's  conducted  in recent  years. In
the first round  all shares  in any specific  enterprise  targeted  for IPO-Plus
privatization  are sold at a single  auction conducted  by a centralized  national
exchange. This ensures  transparency  in the bidding  process. Bids  are made  by
investment  funds acting  on behalf  of small  shareholders,  thus ensuring relatively
"well-informed"  price  formation.
INTERMEDIATION
The  role of privatization  investment  funds in capital  market development
It is a central  feature  of IPO-Plus  privatization  that investment  funds act
as intermediaries  and individuals  do not participate  directly  as owners  of
enterprise  shares. In most  mass  privatization  schemes,  investment  funds have
emerged  spontaneously  to assemble  and manage  the holdings  of individual
shareholders. In Poland  and Kazakstan  a mandated,  limited  number  of funds
are core institutions  of the privatization  programs. IPO-Plus  combines  features
of both  approaches:  investment  funds are an integral  part of the privatization
mechanism, but they are not mandated  by the authorities.
There are several  reasons  for adopting  indirect  ownership  through  funds
as the basis  for IPO-Plus privatization. First, PPS's  are offered  to small
investors  at a low denomination  to encourage  widespread  participation  in the
Government-backed  program. Diversification  of risks  through  funds is a
desirable  safe-guard  for investor  savings. Second,  were individuals  to
participate  in the ownership  of enterprise  shares  directly,  it would be much more
complex  to administer  the deferred  payment  for enterprise  shares,  the size of
which is related  to the number  of PPS's  sold and to manage  the bidding  process
for enterprise  shares. Since  they are separately  capitalized  incorporated  entities
with limited  liability,  PIF's are able  to assume  liability  (and provide  some security)
for the deferred  payment  on enterprise  shares. Individual  share- holders  in the
funds would not be able to provide  similar  security,  nor would they be willing  to
take on such liabilities. Third,  the requirement  that enterprise  shares  are bought
by PIF's  on behalf of PPS holders  - rather  than by individuals  - will encourage
the accumulation  of block  holdings  of enterprise  shares. This enhances  the
incentive  for management  companies  administering  the PIF's  to engage  in
enterprise  restructuring.  The aim is to engineer  a form of change  of ownership16
which  ensures  that incentives  are in place  for subsequent  enterprise
restructuring.
Finding  real owners,  able to discipline  managers  of privatized  enterprises
and carry out restructuring,  has been a central  issue in discussions  on enterprise
privatization  since  the very beginning  of the transition. Privatization  investment
funds were to provide  a "short-cut"  to enforcing  corporate  governance. It is still
too early  to judge whether  the funds prove  to fulfill these expectations.  This is
true of spontaneous  funds as in Russia  and the Czech republic  and state-
engineered  funds as in Poland  and Kazakstan. 2'
As investment  funds are an integral  part of IPO-Plus privatization,  care
has to be taken in designing  the structure  of privatization  investment  funds
(PIF's)  priorto launching  IPO-Plus  privatization. This requires  the authorities  to
specify  up-front  a coherent  legal  and regulatory  framework  for investment  funds
and to establish  the institutional  infrastructure  for registering  and trading
enterprise  shares,  thus reducing  considerably  the dangers  of fraud and
misrepresentation  which have  been a feature  of investment  funds in some
emerging  markets.
Investment  funds will also play an important  role in promoting  capital
market  development  by advertising  and marketing  their shares  to the public,  by
assembling  and assessing  information  on enterprise  prospects  and by providing
opportunities  for risk  diversification  for small private  investors.
Investment  funds and other types  of collectively-owned  investment
institutions  do not normally  play as large  a part in the early stages  of capital
market  development  as they do in developed  markets. In the early stages  of the
transition  to a market  economy  individuals,  whether  managers  or mafiosi,  tend to
acquire  the attractive  assets. It is only later in the development  process  that
individuals  who have  grown  wealthy  through  risky entrepreneurial  activities  (or
their heirs,  the next generation)  become  risk  averse,  and more interested  in
capital  protection  than capital  accumulation.  Thus, in order  to stimulate
investment  in PPS's  in the IPO-Plus  scheme,  it is important  that PPS  purchasers
come to regard  themselves  as part of the entrepreneurial  process  of wealth
accumulation.
Under IPO-Plus  privatization  investment  funds (PIF's) are closed-ended
funds. They are not obliged  to redeem  their shares  on a regular  basis  and
shareholders  may  buy shares  in the funds only during  the pre-defined
21 Evidence  to date  suggests  that  state  control  of the  Polish  National  Investment  Funds  initially
weakened  the funds'  mandate  to undertake  enterprise  restructuring.  Subsequently,  however,  the
Polish  funds  have been  more inclined  to take a pro-active,  long-term  position  in restructuring
enterprises  than  their Russian  counterparts.17
22 subscription  period . Once  the subscription  to a PIF is closed,  attracting  more
funds  would require  opening  a separate  PIF. PlF's could in principle  be
organized  as corporate  entities,  mutual  funds or as unincorporated  entities,  but
in economies  in transition,  where company  law is well defined  and contract  law is
only emerging,  the preferred  form of establishment  will most  probably  be the
corporate  form.
Unlike  typical  corporations,  it is a requirement  that privatization  investment
funds be founded and managed  by outside  fund managers,  which are
established  as separate  legal entities. The business  risks of the management
companies  are separate  from  the risks associated  with the return  on the funds
under  their management. This separation  of responsibility  has several
advantages. First,  the remuneration  of the fund managers  is transparent  as is
the return  on the funds under  their management. Second,  management
companies  are able to build  expertise  by managing  multiple  funds. Third,  the
shareholders  of a fund can elect  to change  the fund managers,  should  they not
be satisfied  with the performance  of the management  company. 23
As a result  of the close link between  capital market  development  and
IPO-Plus privatization,  the authorities  assume  more  responsibility  for the
soundness  of the nascent  capital  market  than under  other methods  of
privatization. The authorities  will need  to focus  on three fundamental  factors,
which will support  the sound  management  of PIF's: the terms  of the contract
between  the PIF's and the management  companies,  the corporate  governance
exercised  by the shareholders  of the PIF's  and the oversight  exercised  by the
supervisory  authorities  themselves:
*  Fund managers  may  be encouraged  to act in the long-term  interests  of PIF
shareholders  by linking  their remuneration  to performance  indicators.  As in
other emerging  markets  it may,  however,  be difficult  to use such indicators
as the growth  in net asset  value of funds under  management  while the
secondary  market  for enterprise  shares  is not  well developed. 24
22  As discussed  later  in  the  text,  the  fact  that  PIF's  are  closed-end  funds  makes  it essential  to
establish  a liquid  secondary  market  so  as  to allow  investors  to redeem  their  shares.
23 In  transition  economies  enabling  fund  managers  and  PIF's  to fulfill  these  roles  may  require
amendments  to the  company  law. Without  such  amendments  the  company  law  in transition
economies  may  well require  managers  of a company  to be  the original  shareholders.  This
contrasts  with the role  of fund  managers  envisaged  in the text,  which is purely  administrative.  The
company  law  may also  limit  flexibility  of a corporation  in opening  subscription  to a new  series  of its
shares.  PIF's  will  need  to be  able  to open  new  share  subscriptions.
24 It may  also  be difficult  to define  indicators,  which are free  from manipulation  and are linked  to
the long-term  performance  of enterprise  shares  rather  than  short-term  price  fluctuations.  One  way
of focusing  the attention  of fund  managers  on  the long-term  growth  in share  value  would  be  to
give  fund mangers  an equity  option,  the  size of  which is linked  to the achievement  of pre-defined
target indicators.18
*  As investors  in PPS's  pay in cash  for their participation  in the privatization
process,  rather than acquiring  shares  for "free",  they have incentives  to take
a more  active role in governance  of the PIF's.  On the whole, investment
management  is built on more  solid foundation  in those countries  where
investors  have had  to pay for their shareholdings  than getting  them for
25 nothing.  Direct  corporate  governance  exercised  by PIF  shareholders
depends  on participation  at annual  meetings. To exercise  their influence  at
these meetings  it is important  that shareholders  are given  equal voting rights
and the right of approval  in selecting  shareholder  representatives  on the
supervisory  board  and changes  in fund investment  and management
policies.  By insisting  on the establishment  of supervisory  boards  the
regulatory  authorities  can assist  in protecting  shareholder  interests. These
boards can perform  control  functions  such as supervising  management  costs
and investment  policies,  ensuring  that reliable  information  is provided  to
shareholders,  and assessing  the fees paid  to PIF managers. It would,
however,  be mistaken  to place  too much reliance  on the role of supervisory
boards. Board members  will be less  well-informed  and less motivated  to
manage  fund dispositions  than the fund managers  under  their surveillance. 26
*  The function  of the securities  regulatory  authority  is to establish  regulatory
practices  for PIF's  and their management  companies. These  will include
requirements  as to adequate  reserves  for PIF's and management
companies,  disclosure  requirements  as regards  investments  and investment
policies, procedures  for protecting  current  shareholders  and issuing  new
shares,  accounting  practices  for PIF's  and management  companies  etc.
Establishing  the institutional  and regulatory  framework  for the PIF's  is
essential  to the soundness  of the privatization  process. While  the government
will need to guide the process  of establishing  and maintaining  this framework,
the danger  under IPO-Plus  privatization  may  well be too little  involvement  in
enforcing  the "rules  of the game"  and too much  involvement  in the game  itself.
In addition  to taking an active role in designing  and regulating  the PIF's,  the
government  is the source  of supply  of shares  (in enterprises  being privatized)
and determines  the terms of the deferred  payment  for enterprise  shares. It
follows that the success  of IPO-Plus  privatization  will depend  crucially  on the
govemment  giving its full support  to the  program.  This support  will entail  showing
restraint  from interfering  unnecessarily  in the operation  of the PIF's and their
25 An example  of the  cash  subscription  effect  is Hungary,  where  shareholders  are  demanding
good  results  and  better  service.  Shareholders  in  "free  share"  countries  believe  they  do  not  stand
to lose  anything  and  are  more  apathetic.
26 If boards  are  to police  conflicts  of interest  between  fund  managers  and  investors  in  the  funds,  it
is  essential  that  board  members  are  independent  of the  management  companies.  In the  USA  it is
a requirement  of the  Investment  Companies  Act  that  at least  40  percent  of the  members  of the
board  of investment  funds  are  independent  of the  fund's  management  company.  In transition
economies  this  degree  of independence  may  be  more  difficult  to enforce.19
relations  to their shareholders. Confidence  in the program  will depend  on the
government  exercising  responsible  oversight,  while fully respecting  the role of
PIF's as independent  financial  institutions.
Experience  regarding  the supervision  of funds participating  in mass
privatization  schemes  has been mixed. On the one hand  there are few cases of
outright  fraud committed  by PIF's. On  the other hand many funds could  be
accused  of neglecting  investor  interests,  misrepresentation,  passivity,  erosion  of
accumulated  assets  etc. - i.e. behavior  that would be prosecuted  in mature
markets. It is important  to build institutional  capacity  in the supervision  of
security  markets  from  the very beginning  of the privatization  process. Parallel  to
the development  of government  supervision  PIF's  should  be encouraged  to
establish  self-regulatory  organizations  to assist  in supervision  of market
participants  and introduce  operational  standards.
As PIF's collect  some cash  from the sale of PPS's,  they may not be as
liquidity  constrained  as privatization  funds in an MPP  environment. Nonetheless,
due to high  start-up  costs  and low enterprise  profitability  the return on PIF assets
may be low subsequent  to enterprise  privatization. In the first period  of their
operation,  the terms of the deferred  payment  for enterprise  shares  may
determine  the viability  of the PIF's.  As mentioned  above,  these terms should  be
such that they allow  the PIF's  to partake  constructively  in enterprise  restructuring
(by  exercising  corporate  governance  as outside  owners)  and to consolidate  their
own capitalization. Following  the grace period  of the deferred  payment,  the
situation  could  arise  where  a PIF is unable  to honor  its obligations. This could
result  in the PIF having  to finance repayments  of the deferred  payment  by the
sale of enterprise  shares  in its portfolio. Under  no circumstances  should  the
govemment  undertake  to re-capitalize  PIF's by buying  shares  in PIF's, as this
would amount  to re-nationalization  of enterprise  assets.
SECONDARY  MARKET  DEVELOPMENT
IFO-Plus promotes  capital  market  development
Capital  market  development  is an integral  part of IPO-Plus privatization.
Already  prior  to initiating  IPO-Plus privatization  it will be necessary  to establish
an auction mechanism  for the sale of enterprise  shares,  a reliable  share registry,
mechanisms  for selling PPS's  and the regulatory  and supervisory  infrastructure
for privatization  investment  funds. Once  the process  for the initial  transfer  of
ownership  has begun  and investment  funds have accumulated  portfolios  of
enterprise  shares,  it will be essential  to facilitate  secondary  market  trading.
The success  of IPO-Plus privatization  depends  on the ability  of the
privatization  investment  funds to trade their enterprise  shares  and on the ability20
of shareholders  in the funds to trade their PPS's. Secondary  market  trading  will
be fundamental  to the corporate  governance  exercised  by the PIF's  with regard
to the enterprises  and by the shareholders  of the PIF's  with regard  to the PIF's
themselves. PIF's need  to be able to buy and sell enterprise  shares  so as to
accumulate  larger  holdings  of shares  in some  enterprises  and divest other
enterprises. Unless  they are able  to adjust  their portfolios,  PIF's  will be unable  to
exercise  efficient  corporate  governance. Similarly,  PPS  holders  need to be able
to trade their holdings  of PIF shares,  reflecting  changed  perceptions  of the
returns  being achieved  by the PIF's. 27
Shares  in the enterprises  sold to the PIF's  are originally  bought  on
favorable  terms. Only in trading on the secondary  market  will the price of
enterprise  shares  begin  to reflect  perceptions  of market  participants  regarding
potential  future  enterprise  earning  capacity.
Similarly,  the shares  in investment  funds, PPS's,  are initially  sold at an
identical  pre-set  price. Again, establishing  a market  value  for the PPS's  depends
on secondary  trading in the PPS's,  where prices  reflect  the efficiency  of the
management  companies  in selecting  and trading enterprise  shares  and in
exercising  corporate  governance. Secondary  market  pricing  of shares  in closed-
ended  funds will also exercise  a valuable  commercial  discipline  on fund
managers. If a fund manager's  performs  poorly,  then the preponderance  of
sellers  over buyers  will cause  the share price  to trade at a discount  to net asset
value. As a result  a secondary  or tertiary issue  of shares  will be made  harder,  as
will launching  a new fund. PPS's  in a new fund will not be sold if buyers  expect
the secondary  market  to impose  a discount  to net asset  value. By contrast,
managers  who perform  well will  find that PPS's  in the PIF's  under  their
management  trade at a premium  to net asset  value. These managers  will be
able to increase  funds under  their management  relatively  easily.
As IPO-Plus privatization  puts considerable  emphasis  on capital  market
development  as part of the privatization  process  itself,  it should  be possible  to
build the institutional  structure  for secondary  market  trading (registration  and
settlement  systems)  onto the mechanisms  already  established  for the primary
transfer  of enterprise  shares  and sale of PPS's.
The management  companies  of the larger PIF's  will manage  more  funds
than other investors,  and will most likely  dominate  secondary  market  trading.
The tendency  will be for these management  companies  to engage  in off-market
block  trading and, unless  they are obliged  to adhere  to strict reporting  rules,
there is a danger  that they will undermine  market  transparency.  To stimulate
secondary  market  trading  and prevent  fraud and insider  dealing  transparency is
27 Since  the  PIF's  are  closed-ended  funds  formed  as  companies,  they  will be  unable  to redeem
the  PPS's  bought  by  citizens,  as  would  be  the  case  with  open-ended  mutual  funds.21
essential. Immediately  following  all trades market,  participants  should  be obliged
to provide  information  on trading  volumes  and prices  to a widely  accessible,
centralized  information  dissemination  system.
Similar  concerns  are common  to capital  market  development  in all
emerging  markets. The advantage  of IPO-Plus privatization  is that it lays  the
foundation  for transparent,  well-functioning  share  trading and registration
systems,  and rather  than letting  the market  determine  the need for capital  market
institutions  and their nature  - as has often been  the case under  MPP's  - IPO-
Plus integrates  privatization  with the process  of establishing  well-functioning  and
sound capital  market  institutions. IPO-Plus recognizes  the "public  good"  nature
of financial  markets  and the important  role of the state in establishing  such
markets. This is similar  to the Polish  multi-track  approach  to privatization,  which
is presented  in Box 11.  In Poland  both  the MPP  and IPO's rely heavily  on capital
market  development.
Box 11  IPO-Plus has learnt from Polish experience
Poland  chose  not  to  implement  an  "across  the  board"  radical  MPP.  Privatization  was
conducted  through  a multi-track  approach  based  on  a mix  of "classic"  privatization  methods  and
the  MPP  model.  In  effect,  this  multi-track  approach  contained  many  of the  features  of IPO-Plus,
although  they  were  scattered  among  three  main  privatization  tracks:  initial  public  offerings  (IPO's),
management/employees  buy-outs  (MEBO's)  and  the  MPP.
IPO's
The  first  privatization  cases  were  patterned  after  the  British  privatization  experience  of the
1980's.  For  logistical  reasons  five  enterprises  were  offered  to the  public  in  one  batch  rather  than
a case-by-case  basis.  As  capital  market  infrastructure  was  underdeveloped,  there  were
economies  of scale  in  offering  all five  companies  together.  Although  these  IPO's  were  not
underwritten,  offers  were  solicited  at a fixed  price.  Demand  was  also  enhanced  by  allowing
investors  to pay  with  a treasury  bond  with  20 percent  discount.  However,  following  the  "Bank
Slaski  debacle",  where  fixed  subscription  prices  were  undervalued  by  a factor  of 10  in secondary
trading,  fixed-price  subscription  was  later  replaced  by an  auction  mechanism.  Eventually,  the
practice  of simplified  IPO's  was  abandoned  and  the  process  slowed-down  considerably.
MEBO's
Small  and  medium  size  enterprises,  mainly  in  trade,  services  and  light  industries,  were
offered  to managers  and  employees  using  a special  deferred  payment  scheme  with  below  market
interest  rates. This  proved  to be  a successful  privatization  path  for small  and  medium  sized
enterprises,  and  failures  to repay  the  debt  were  few. MEBO's  may  not  be  as successful  in  turning
around  management  in larger  companies.
MPP's
Many  features  of the  Polish  MPP  program  are  similar  to those  of the  IPO-Plus.  Despite
its name,  and  in  contrast  to the  Russian  MPP,  the  Polish  MPP  is limited  to a relatively  small
number  of companies  - less  than  600. The  companies  were  selected  more  carefully  than  in  the
Russian  MPP.  National  Investment  Funds  (NIF's)  were  designed  and  introduced  as mandatory
intermediaries.  Their  objectives  have  been  to improve  corporate  governance  of privatized  firms
by  allocating  large  packages  of shares  (1/3)  to one  NIF,  and  to protect  unsophisticated  investors22
by providing  professional  management  and  diversified  portfolios  in the NIF's. Management
companies  are operated  by consortia  of foreign  and local  investment  banks. These  companies
operate  under management  contracts  and  are selected  according  to transparent  rules.
Privatization  certificates  are dematerialized  and  traded  at the Warsaw  Stock  Exchange  (WSE).
NIFs'  shares  are also dematerialized  and  will be  traded  at the  WSE. These  shares  will  follow  the
same  listing  requirements  as  those of any publicly-owned  joint-stock  company. NIF managers
may  decide  to float  some companies  from their portfolios  on the  WSE or sell  them  to strategic
investors.
CONCLUSION
Milestones  in preparing  IPO-Plus
The first milestone  in establishing  the foundation  for IPO-Plus is preparing
the legal  framework. The legal  framework  includes  generic  investment  funds
legislation,  a special  law (or decree)  governing  the establishment  and operation
of the PIF's and often necessary  adjustments  in the joint stock company  law.
Implementation  of the program  will require  establishing
procedures  for registration  of PIF's  and management  companies,  public
subscription  for PPS's,  auction  sales  and access  to the deferred  payment. Also
needed  are models  for such documents  as: enterprise  prospectuses,
management  agreements  between  the management  companies  and the PIF's,
PIF  charters,  share sale and deferred  payment  agreements.
The legal  framework  must be very specific  in requiring  a "second  round"  of
the auctions  where prices  are allowed  to decrease  and shares  are sold at
whatever  price, they will fetch. In transition  economies,  selling  companies  at
below their "nominal  book  value" may be politically  difficult,  because  the book
value is deemed  to reflect  the value  of state property  invested  in the enterprise
over  the years. It is also important  that the legal  framework  confirms  that
enterprise  shares  owned  by the PIF's  are fully  transferable,  even  where  they are
used as collateral  under  the deferred  payment  mechanism.
An important  element  in the success  of IPO-Plus is the quality  of the
enterprises  chosen  for privatization  through  the program. Although  the program
may be spread  over time and only few enterprises  are offered  in each auction,  it
is important  that the list of enterprises  targeted  for the IPO-Plus is approved  and
published  in advance  of the launch  of the program. This is necessary  to
motivate  potential  investors  to join the program  by setting  up management
companies,  founding  PIF's and buying  shares  in  the PIF's. The publication  of the
enterprises  selected  for the program  is a necessary  milestone  in preparing  IPO-
Plus  privatization.
Another milestone  is the establishing  a Government  body  to implement
the privatization  process,  a centralized  exchange  to conduct  the auctions  on a
transparent  basis, a centralized  share registrary  to manage  the registration  of the
PPS's  and enterprise  shares  and a distribution  network  for selling PPS's  to the23
public. It will be expedient  to install  computer-based  systems  for the sale of
enterprise  shares  to the PIF's,  thereby  ensuring  that correct  access  is given  to
deferred  payment,  and facilitating  the collection  of information  on the sale of
PPS's  to the public. The sale of PPS's  will need to be undertaken  on a fee-
paying  basis  through  local institutions,  such as through  a bank  with a suitably
diversified  branch network.
A recent  example  of the design  and implementation  of the IPO-Plus
scheme  in Uzbekistan  is presented  in Box 111.
Box Ill  The PIF  Scheme  in Uzbekistan:  design  and
implementation
Uzbek decision-makers were close observers of the Russian MPP, and determined to
follow an alternative approach.  The following quotation from President Karimov's book "Along the
Road  to Deepening  Economic  Reform'  illustrates  the  Uzbek  position:  "We  have  arrived  at a
definite conclusion that state property may be transformed into another form of ownership only
through its sale to a new owner..  .The essence of the approach is rather simple: to abandon a
faceless voucherized proprietor and turn over property to a real owner capable of using the
property and ensuring its efficient utilization."
Program Design  The Uzbek PIF scheme follows the IPO-Plus model.
Public participation shares.  The price of each share is 100 sums equivalent to about 5 to
10 percent of the average monthly wage, or about 20 percent of the minimum wage.  This is about
the same as the fee paid for a voucher in the Czech program.  Each citizen can buy no more than
100 shares in a single investment fund.
Sale of enterprise shares to investment funds.  Investment funds are being offered shares
in 600 pre-selected medium and large enterprises.  The government is committed to privatize 74
percent of enterprise shares in these enterprises. At least 30 percent of the shares are to be sold
to the funds at preferential terms (low offer price and deferred payment), 21 percent will be sold
through the stock exchange, and no more than 23 percent to employees.  Funds will also have
access to buying shares on the secondary market and from employees.  Thus funds will be able
to acquire up to 74 percent of the shares in an enterprise.
Corporate govemance.  The influence of any single fund on the management of an
enterprise depends on its share of the ownership of the enterprise.  As in other countries, the
shares of an enterprise owned by a single fund is limited (to 35 percent), but is higher than
imposed in the Czech Republic (20 percent), Russia (25 percent) and Poland (33 percent). There
is no limit on the total share held by all funds, and PIF's may cooperate to establish a working
majority on the boards of enterprises.
Deferred payment.  For each PPS invested in enterprise shares PIF's are given access to
buy five more with deferred payment.  The coefficient of five was selected on the basis of the
nominal book value of the enterprises targeted for privatization and estimated sales of PPS's to
the population.  To ensure the long-term viability of the funds, they are given seven years to repay
the credit with a four-year grace period during which no interest will accrue.
Program Implementation24
A Presidential  decree  on the  establishing  and  operating  PIF's  was signed  on June 18th,
1996. Subsequently  model  documents  for PIF charters,  management  agreements,  prospectuses
etc.  were adopted. After  intensive  study  of potential  candidates  for privatization,  a decree  was
issued  on  September  26th  announcing  the  selection  of the first 300  enterprises.  The list  of
enterprises  was published  in the press. A second  list is to be published  in mid-1997.  The
inclusion  of relatively  good  companies  in the list  was seen by PIF managers  as a signal  of  the
Government's  commitment  to the program  and  provided  momentum  for launching  the program.
Implementation  began  in October  1996  and the  first pilot  auction  was held  in December
1996. The pilot  stage  focused  on Tashkent  and  the sale  of shares  was primarily  conducted
through  mahalas  (extended  families)  and  the PIFs'  own selling  points. The program  is in the
process  of being  rolled  out  to the regions,  where  sales  of PPS's  will be conducted  through  the
branches  of Narodybank  (the former  savings  bank). Sales  will be promoted  by a nation-wide
publicity  campaign.  With 38 licensed  PIF's  the program  has  passed  its infancy  and is gaining
momentum.
Thirty  enterprises  were sold  at the  first three auctions. The majority  of  these enterprises
were large:  only  4 had less  than  200  employees  and  3 had  about  1500  employees.  Interviews
show  that,  rather  than being  sold  predominantly  to "yuppies",  there are many  pensioners  and
"middle  class"  citizens  among  the initial  investors  in the  scheme.
Advantages  of IPO-Plus - a summary
The main  advantage  of the IPO-Plus in comparison  to MPP's  based  on
the free transfer  of ownership  rights is that the IPO-Plus has a better  chance  to
create  "real  owners". This can be attributed  to the commercial  features  of IPO-
Plus. Investors  are given  a subsidy,  but only in proportion  to what  they
themselves  choose  to pay. The individual  is able to choose  - up to a certain
ceiling  - how much  to invest in the program.
IPO-Plus is particularly  appropriate  where  the objective  is to encourage
outside  ownership  in contrast  to significant  employee  ownership. IPO-Plus
privatization  encourages  the emergence  of market  intermediaries  and ensures
concentration  of enterprise  shares  in investment  funds. Outside  ownership  and
concentration  of share  voting rights provide  the foundation  for enterprise
restructuring  and economic  growth.25
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